Code Attestation with Compressed Instruction Code by Vetter, Benjamin & Westhoff, Dirk
ar
X
iv
:1
10
2.
53
22
v1
  [
cs
.C
R]
  2
5 F
eb
 20
11
Code Attestation with Compressed Instruction Code
Benjamin Vetter, Dirk Westhoff
Fakultät Technik und Informatik
HAW Hamburg
Hamburg, Germany
{vetter_b, westhoff}@informatik.haw-hamburg.de
ABSTRACT
Available purely software based code attestation protocols
have recently been shown to be cheatable. In this work we
propose to upload compressed instruction code to make the
code attestation protocol robust against a so called com-
presssion attack. The described secure code attestation pro-
tocol makes use of recently proposed micro-controller archi-
tectures for reading out compressed instruction code. We
point out that the proposed concept only makes sense if the
provided cost/benefit ratio for the aforementioned micro-
controller is higher than an alternative hardware based so-
lution requiring a tamper-resistant hardware module.
Keywords
Secure code attestation, compression attack, compressed in-
struction code, lossless data compression
1. INTRODUCTION
The evolution of the ubiquitous computing vision towards
full-fledged real world applications faces a diversity of new
problems. Besides other issues and due to the fact that
for many applications due to the large number of involved
end-devices cost-efficient hardware is an issue, one can not
guarantee that a code image which once has been uploaded
on a tiny, non-tamper resistant device, will always run in
a correct and un-manipulated way. Even worse, it may be-
have in a Byzantine manner such that the device sometimes
behaves correctly and sometimes behaves incorrectly.
One strategy to control respectively detect such misbehaving
nodes in a sensor network, or, more generally, in an M2M
setting, is to run from time to time a challenge-response
protocol between the restricted device and a master device
- the verifier - that is sending the challenge.
However, recently it has been shown that purely software
based code attestation [5], [4], [6] is vulnerable against a
set of attacks. Basically one can subdivide code attestation
techniques into two subsets: the first class of approaches is
using challenge-response protocols in conjunction with harsh
timing restrictions for the restricted device’s response. Oth-
erwise an attacker could simply load the original code im-
age into the external memory and save program memory
for his own bogus code. Each time the master device trig-
gers the code attestation protocol, for the computation of
the response the cheated prover device reads the original
program from the external memory. Since reading from ex-
ternal memory is much more time consuming, a timing re-
striction at the verifier for the duration between sending the
challenge message and receiving the response message can
detect this. The second proposed class of countermeasures
randomly fills empty program memory to avoid that such
free memory space can be used to infect the device with
bogus code. In their landmark work [7], Castelluccia et al.
have shown that both types of aforementioned countermea-
sures can be circumvented. Later we provide more details
on this. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Sec-
tion 2 introduces the adversary model. Section 3 describes
the so called compression attack the attacker can perform
to break recently proposed code attestation protocols. In
Section 4 we propose our countermeasure to deal with com-
pression attacks and in Section 5 we give insights how to ex-
ecute compressed instruction code as necessary requirement
for this approach. Section 6 discusses suitable compression
algorithms and in Section 7 we provide the security analysis
of the proposed solution. Conclusions and open issues are
presented in Section 8.
2. ADVERSARY MODEL
After node deployment and before the first round of the at-
testation protocol starts, the attacker has full control over
all device memories such that he can modify program mem-
ory or any other memories like e.g. the external memory.
At attestation time, when the challenge-response based at-
testation protocol is running, the attacker has no physical
control over the restricted device anymore. However, please
note that the device may yet run malicious code. It is up to
the code attestation protocol to detect this independently of
the fact that the attacker may find ways to store the orig-
inal uploaded code image at a different memory than the
program memory. Note that we do not consider fluctual
data memory. Control Flow Integrity could prevent attacks
that use techniques like Return-Oriented Programming [7],
[10], [11]. Obviously, during the phase in which the attacker
has full control over the restricted device, the attacker is
also able to either modify the code for the code-attestation
protocol itself or to read out any sensitive data like e.g. pre-
shared keys in case the code attestation protocol would be
based on this.
3. COMPRESSION ATTACK
One major challenge for a purely software-based code at-
testation for embedded devices is the so called compression
attack. This attack cheats a basic challenge-response based
code attestation as follows: the originally uploaded program
which shall temporarily be checked by the attestation proto-
col to be exclusively stored in the program memory is sub-
sequently compressed by the attacker. Depending on the
concrete compression algorithm and according to the actual
uploaded code image for a given application the compression
gain ranges from 12% up to 47% [7]. An attacker can use
such free program memory to store and run bogus code on
the node’s program memory. Note that current solutions for
secure code-attestation also propose to fill the free program
memory with pseudorandomly generated words instead of
the default entry 0FF. This defends against an attacker who
could use this previously unused memory for uploading a
bogus code image in an undetected way. Since the afore-
mentioned pseudorandomly generated words are required to
be part of the response of a code attestation protocol, the
verifier needs to know respectively may be able to compute
such pseudorandomly generated words.
However, Castelluccia et al. have shown that cheating such
kinds of attestation protocols is still possible: whenever the
restricted device (prover) receives a nonce from the master
device (verifier) it decompresses the earlier compressed orig-
inal program on-the-fly and subsequently computes the hash
value x = h(nonce||CI || PRW ) by applying the hash func-
tion h(). The x is the checksum respectively the response of
the challenge-response protocol. The CI denotes the orig-
inally uploaded code image and the PRW is the pseudo-
randomly filled content within the remaining free program
memory at load-time. Obviously this simple challenge-response
based code attestation fails: Whenever the prover receives
a fresh nonce (the master device initiated the code attesta-
tion protocol), the attacker decompresses the compressed CI
and writes it into the program memory again. This provides
all the relevant input parameters for the computation of the
hash function, namely the CI , the nonce, and the PRW such
that the master device subsequently receives the response x
within a given time interval which it verifies to be correct.
Finally note that, to save his own bogusly uploaded code
image C˜I, the attacker could have stored C˜I also within the
external memory. Subsequently to the time-critical code at-
testation phase, he has enough time to again compress the
CI and read C˜I from external memory to program memory.
4. ATTESTATION OF COMPRESSED
INSTRUCTION CODE
Our countermeasure against uploading malicious code into
the program memory and subsequently not being able to
detect this, re-uses and adapts earlier proposed code attes-
tation protocols [4], [5], [6] by at the same time using
i. a hardware extension at the micro-controller, and
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Figure 1: Derivates of the secure code attestation
protocol with lossless data compression algorithm.
ii. fulfilling a strict policy for uploading CIs into the pro-
gram memory.
This policy is to only upload a yet compressed code image
C(CI) into the program memory and to fill the remaining
part with PRW 1. Consequently, the attacker cannot allo-
cate such easily free program memory anymore to tracelessly
upload malicious code by applying the above described com-
pression attack. Note that with the proposed approach the
challenge (a fresh nonce) which goes into the hash computa-
tion for every run of the code-attestation anew, enforces the
prover to always compute the hash value (response) with a
compressed CI and PRW anew. In our proposed setting
the response x thus is computed as h(nonce||C(CI)||PRW )
where the C is a properly chosen lossless data compression
algorithm. More details on the properties of the chosen loss-
less data compression algorithm C and other refinements on
C(CI) will be provided later. The adapted code attestation
protocol is shown in Figure 1 (Option 1).
Please note that still with our proposed adapted code attes-
tation protocol allowing to upload only a compressed code
image into the program memory it is essential to enforce a
runtime restriction as a countermeasure against an attack in
which the original code image or parts of it are shifted to the
external memory. We term ǫ as the duration of the time in-
terval [t0, t1] measured by the local clock of the verifier. The
t0 denotes the sending time of the challenge nonce and the
t1 denotes the receiving time of the response x. We empha-
size that a proper choice of the threshold Tem with ǫ < Tem
is prover device-dependent to defend the approach against
attacks using the external memory of the prover device.
5. EXECUTION OF COMPRESSED
INSTRUCTION CODE
Now that an attacker cannot such easily cheat the code-
attestation protocol anymore by simply compressing the orig-
inally uploaded code image and subsequently decompressing
it if needed, the remaining problem with this approach is
how to run compressed code? To solve this issue one needs
1We decided not to compress the PRW since in fact a
good choice of the pseudorandomly filled words can not
be compressed anymore. In fact C(PRW ) would result in
|C(PRW )| ≥ |PRW | eventually providing another attack
vector to save memory by computing C−1(C(PRW )).
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Figure 2: Micro-controller architecture with com-
pressed code memory and dictionary memory [8].
to incorporate a hardware extension at the micro-controller.
Please note that the approach to upload a compressed code
image into the program memory is not new. It has recently
been proposed by Yamada et al. [8]. Early work on this can
be found in [1].
However, originally it has been proposed with the objec-
tive to offer a high compression ratio and a fast instruc-
tion expendability - and not as a building block to protect
against a bogus code image in the program memory like
we are proposing. Envisioned is a program memory which
includes a dictionary memory or other means to start the
decompression operation. This component is responsible for
storing instruction codes which appear in a typical program
image. Figure 2 illustrates the micro-controller architecture
which is proposed in [8]. Another compression technique
based on a dictionary has been presented by Lefurgy et al.
in [2].
So we propose to only allow to load yet compressed code
into the program memory and to decompress the code at
runtime. The decompression unit is located at the program
memory with a controller passing compressed code instruc-
tions to the dictionary memory. This architecture can be
used to support the defense against attacks where free pro-
gram memory space can be generated by compressing the
originally uploaded code image and filling this gap with ma-
licious code (including the compression/decompression func-
tion). A code attestation protocol based on simply hash-
ing the original code image plus the remaining free program
memory space would not detect such an attack.
Some Remarks: The dictionary memory as well as the com-
pressed code memory are regions within the program mem-
ory. Thus, in particular the dictionary memory is no ded-
icated memory module, neither separated nor protected in
a specific manner. Consequently, an attacker could either
fully overwrite or partially modify the dictionary memory.
To be able to subsequently decompress the CI at runtime
we are not allowed to compress the dictionary (dic) itself.
We refine the computation of the response x such that:
x = h(nonce||C(CI)||dic||PRW ) (1)
This additional consideration of the dictionary has also been
reflected within Figure 1 (Option 2a).
6. CHOICE OF THE DATA COMPRESSION
ALGORITHM
6.1 Envisioned Properties
The proper choice of a suitable lossless data compression al-
gorithm C is essential with respect to the proposed security
architecture. We need to find a lossless data compression
algorithm which shall provide the following partially con-
flicting properties:
1. a high compression ratio for a typical CI (compared
to competing lossless data compression algorithms);
2. very fast decompression (vice versa the performance of
the compression operation can be relatively poor);
3. the overall decompression concept is required to sup-
port entry-points at which the decompression opera-
tion can start;
With respect to property number one we state that it is one
of the properties of any lossless data compression algorithm
that for typical input files containing many frequently used
data chunks the compression rate is rather high. However,
vice versa if the input file contains many seldomly used data
chunks the resulting compression ratio is rather poor. More-
over, the compression algorithm Ch chosen by the honest
party should ideally provide the highest compression rate
compared to other compression candidates, e.g. Ca cho-
sen by the attacker. Otherwise the attacker could apply
Ca(Ch(CI)) to save program memory for C˜I.
The second property is required since decompression of a
code image instruction should ideally not delay the execu-
tion of the originally loaded program. On the contrary there
is no technical requirement that restricts the compression
time before uploading the CI .
Entry points which define the positions at which the de-
compression operation starts to decompress the next code
instruction can be either chosen to be placed at fix posi-
tions of the compressed CI , with a fix and equal distance
for a compressed chunk representing a single code image in-
struction. This can be achieved by using a dictionary. A
complementary approach would be to allow entry points at
variable positions supporting compression chunks with dif-
ferent sizes. Clearly the latter provides a better compression
ratio at the cost of a higher management effort for finding
the next entry-point. A cache together with a line address
table (LAT) are frequently used for this [1]. Note that cache
and LAT can be independently applied of the concretely cho-
sen compression algorithm. For this reason we prefer a LAT
instead of a dictionary. Our choice has been reflected in
Figure 2.
Figure 3: Compression ratios for multi-hop oscillo-
scope program image of typical compression algo-
rithms for varying blocksizes.
6.2 Candidates
Initially we considered Canonical Huffman Encoding (CHE)
[3] as lossless data compression algorithm C with canonical
Huffman tree. To handle entry points at variable positions
with the objective to provide a higher compression rate we
use a LAT as a list of entry points. Note that with this
approach a dictionary memory is not required anymore such
that in Figure 1 Option 2b becomes valid:
x = h(nonce||C(CI)||LAT ||PRW ) (2)
Also, since each entry is listed only one time within the
LAT, later we show that the attacker does not succeed in
sufficiently compressing the LAT. It turns out that to a large
degree this is also true in case the attacker tries to compress
the canonical Huffman tree. However, the disadvantage of
the CHE for our purposes is its relatively small gain of com-
pression results on MicaZ with on average 12.19% for vari-
ous typical WSN programs [7]. For comparison, the lossless
data compression algorithm Prediction by Partial Matching
(PPM) provides an average gain of 47.45% for typical WSN
applications. Unfortunately, such a significant gain differ-
ence of the compression algorithms CHE and PPM again
opens the door for an attack to make use of this gain differ-
ence of approximately 35%. The attacker can apply PPM
on the compressed code image CCHE(CI) and again gener-
ate free space for his own bogus malicious code in either of
the two ways:
1. Ca(Ch(CI)) := CPPM (CCHE(CI)), respectively
2. Ca(C
−1
h (Ch(CI))) := CPPM (C
−1
CHE(CCHE(CI)))
C−1 denotes the decompression operation. Due to the afore-
mentioned reason we also analyzed Deflate, ZPAQ and fur-
ther derivates of PPM, namely PZIP and PPMZ. Please note
that the hardware supported compression scheme proposed
by Wolf et al. [1] doesn’t limit the set of lossless compression
algorithms. It only limits the blocksize sh, which has to be
equal to the available cache size (sh = |cache|).
Figure 4: Amount of decompressed data for varying
block sizes during the attestation.
Figure 3 shows that the chosen algorithms provide varying
compression ratios depending on the block size sh. This is
illustrated for our benchmark code image multi-hop oscil-
loscope (|CI | = 25.9KB) which ships with TinyOS. Large
block sizes provide better compression ratios than small block
sizes. If we choose and apply a tuple (Ch, sh) the attacker
can only gain additional free memory |Ca(Ch(CI))|−|Ch(CI)|
= |C˜I | by choosing
1. sa > sh if Ca = Ch, or
2. otherwise: sa ≤ sh (for some (Ca, sa)).
Nevertheless, if the attacker chooses a much smaller block
size the compression ratio will suffer. Therefore, when we
compress the CI with a larger block size the attacker is
forced to use a larger block size as well. Since the decom-
pression of larger blocks increases the overhead, the time
necessary for decompression is increased as well, especially
on low-performance platforms like sensor nodes. This fact
becomes significant if we take into account that the attesta-
tion has to run in a pseudrandomly manner with nonce as
the seed for a PRNG forcing a strict ordering of the CI ’s
words when calculating the response x [9]. It forces the
attacker to decompress each block approximately sa times.
Moreover, this disables the attacker to apply a compression
algorithm Ca that sacrifices performance for higher com-
pression ratios since the overhead increases for larger block
sizes sa recognizably. Therefore, the use of such algorithms
is easily detectable with the choice of a large block size sh
and a threshold Tpm as the upper duration for performing
compression attacks on the program memory. Obviously,
ǫ < min{Tem, Tpm} with Tpm > Tem as we will see.
Figure 4 shows the amount of temporarily decompressed
data during the attestation, which increases for larger block
sizes. The attacker has to read about sa ·|Ca(CI)| bytes from
the program memory during the attestation if he compressed
the full CI previously. If the attacker chooses the block size
to be sa = 2048 bytes and Ca to be PZIP, he will have
to read up to 37MB from program memory to decompress
all blocks sa times and subsequently be able to calculate x.
This is a huge overhead compared to |CI | = 25.9KB. For
the attacker, obviously this huge amount of data is an im-
mense burden in particular on platforms with low bandwidth
for reading from program memory. While platforms capa-
ble of reading 50MB/s result in less than 1 second timing
overhead for 2048 byte blocks, platforms capable of reading
only 1MB/s require up to 40 seconds and thus are easily
detectable by the proposed attestation protocol.
Obviously, these overhead to decompress every block sa times
impacts the time necessary for the attacker to calculate the
valid response x for the attestation protocol significantly on
restricted platforms. As an uncompromised node doesn’t
have to calculate C−1h (Ch(CI)) at attestation time, i.e. de-
compress the compressed program image, the block size en-
ables us to raise and adjust the overhead for the attacker
by orders of magnitude to let us discover the existence of
the attacker reliably through a proper choice for the device-
dependent value of ǫ. However, a larger cache size respec-
tively sh slow down the on-the-fly decompression routine
during normal operation of the restricted device. On the
other hand a larger cache decreases the number of cache
misses. Therefore a necessary decompression is more seldom
for a larger cache size, but takes more time to complete.
7. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Our security analysis considers six attack vectors, namely
7.1 decompressing the code image, 7.2 attacks on the LAT,
7.3 attacks by using the external memory, 7.4 replay attacks,
7.5 node depletion attacks, and, finally 7.6 DoS attacks.
7.1 Decompressing the Code Image
The attacker is able to decrease the timing overhead by ex-
ploiting the fact that different blocks can be compressed with
different compression ratios. Therefore, the attacker could
pick only those blocks which provide the best compression
ratios out of all blocks until he gains sufficient memory to
store his bogus code. Since the blocks are yet compressed
with a properly chosen lossless compression algorithm, each
of them provides a similar compression ratio. To overcome
this issue, the attacker could first calculate C−1h (Ch(CI)),
i.e. decompress the compressed CI and compress it for his
own afterwards, i.e. calculate Ca(C
−1
h (Ch(CI))). During
the attestation he then has to calculate Ch(C
−1
a (Ca(CI)))
to pass the attestation. Therefore this method further in-
creases the overhead for the attacker, especially if we choose
a (Ch, sh) that compresses rather slowly. Moreover, the at-
tacker’s possible gain is expected to be low, because blocks
which provide a good compression ratio to the attacker will
provide a good compression ratio to us as well.
However, even without calculating C−1h (Ch(CI)) the attacker
still requires to compress only as much blocks as he needs
to gain enough free memory for the C˜I . The exact number
of blocks an attacker has to use depends on our choice of
(Ch, sh) as well as the attacker’s choice (Ca, sa) and, obvi-
ously |C˜I| itself. Please note that besides the C˜I the at-
tacker has to also store the code of the decompression rou-
tine C−1a and the LATa within the program memory. As
Castelluccia et al. have to spend 1707 bytes for a huffman
decompression routine [7] used in their compression attack,
which is a relatively simple algorithm compared to the com-
pression algorithms proposed in this paper, we force the at-
tacker to compress at least multiple blocks to get a chance
to gain enough space for his needs. In general, the attacker
has to compress
#Blocks =
|C˜I|+ |C−1a |+ |LATa|
GainPerBlock
(3)
where
GainPerBlock =
TotalGain
#Blockstotal
(4)
on average with
TotalGain = |Ch(CI)| − |Ca(CI)| (5)
and
#Blockstotal =
|CI |
sa
. (6)
The memory overhead then is about #Blocks·sa·
|Ca(CI)|
|CI|
·sa.
We assume the attacker has to store at least 1KB of data2,
i.e. |C˜I | + |C−1a | + |LATa| = 1KB and he will calculate
C−1h (Ch(CI)) before compressing CI for his own. For ex-
ample, if we choose (Ch = PZIP, sh = 512 bytes) and the
attacker chooses (Ca = PPMZ, sa = 2048 bytes) the at-
tacker’s memory overhead is about 17.3MB. Figure 5 shows
the attacker’s possible choices for (Ca, sa) to gain sufficient
memory whereas Ch = PZIP with varying sh is our choice
of a compression algorithm. For the attacker’s choices we
focus on compression algorithms mentioned in this paper
only, namely PZIP, PPMZ, ZPAQ and Deflate for block sizes
ranging from 64 bytes to 2048 bytes. On platforms capable
of reading 1MB/s of data from program memory, we argue
that memory overhead above 5MB is easily detectable since
it slows down the attestation for about 5 seconds. There-
fore even if we choose rather small block sizes of sh ≥ 256
bytes the attack is still detectable. Please note that we do
not even take the CPU overhead into account here. From
a security point of view we argue to always use the largest
possible block size sh. In practice cache sizes above 1KB
are hardly feasible, especially on embedded devices with less
than 4KB of data memory. Therefore we propose to choose
(Ch, sh ≥ 512 bytes). Please note that other combinations
will be totally feasible as well, but one has to choose sh for
other compression algorithms more carefully.
7.2 Attacks on the LAT
The countermeasure to the compression attack is the com-
pression of the CI with a suitable data compression al-
gorithm as discussed in Section 7.1. Thus, the only re-
maining non-compressed data besides the PRW which has
been argued to be not effectively compressable is the LATh.
Consequently, if the (Ch, sh) for compressing the CI has
been chosen properly, the only remaining compression at-
tack is to compress the LATh itself to save program memory
(Ca(LATh)). If the attacker succeeds in saving enough pro-
gram memory out of this to additionally store a bogus code
image C˜I and at the same time requires ǫ < min{Tem, Tpm},
2Please note that this is a very optimistic value from the
attacker’s point of view.
Figure 5: The attacker’s possible compression
choices for Ch = PZIP , a varying sh and a platform
capable of reading 1MB/s from program memory.
the attack is successful and not detectable by our code at-
testation protocol. However, recall that a lossless data com-
pression algorithm does not provide the same compression
ratio for every ingoing uncompressed data; in particular a
LAT due to its condensed form can not significantly be com-
pressed as we will see. Moreover, we state that typically it
holds |LATh| << |CI | and |CI | ≤ |PRW |
3. In general, the
number of entries of a LAT can be computed as
#Entries(LAT ) =
|CI |
s
(7)
So, even if Ca(LATh) and Ca(CI) with (Ca, sa) would pro-
vide the same compression ratio, which obviously is not the
case, the absolute gain of program memory for an attacker
who purely can compress the remaining uncompressed LATh
would be significantly smaller. E.g. we assume an embed-
ded device with 128KB of program memory where |CI | =
25.9KB (multi-hop oscilloscope). We further assume sin-
gle LAT entries to be coded using 24 bits, i.e. |LATh| =
#Entries(LATh) · 3 bytes for the proposed block size sh =
512 bytes. The LATh then occupies 153 bytes. Compression
results for the LATh of our benchmark applications are listed
in Table I. For this setting and by applying our countermea-
sure an attacker’s absolute gain of free program memory to
upload a bogus code image C˜I would shrink below 5 bytes
approximately4 whereas in the absence of our proposed so-
lution the attacker could occupy approximately up to 17KB
of the program memory without being detectable.
Again, with a larger choice of the block size sh one could re-
duce the free memory space for an attacker even more. Fur-
thermore, in case the CI is smaller also the LATh shrinks.
E.g. if CI is the BaseStation respectively Sense applica-
3Typical CI sizes for WSN applications are between 10 to
60KBytes such that the |PRW | occupies between 63 Kbytes
to 113 Kbytes [7].
4The attacker can choose other compression algorithms not
mentioned in this paper as well. Although unlikely, other
algorithms could provide slightly better compression ratios.
tion and the block size again is sh = 512 bytes, the attacker
will not gain free memory by compressing the LATh of size
90 respectively 18 bytes using the compression algorithms
mentioned in this paper. Finally, the attacker could over-
write the LATh within the program memory for his own
bogus code; in equivalence to the other program memory
containing compressed code and PRW this attack is de-
tected by the computation and subsequent verification of
x = h(nonce||Ch(CI)||LATh||PRW ).
Table 1: Maximum sizes of bogus code images |C˜I |
for sh = 512 bytes and various applications.
Multi-hop os- BaseStation Sense
cilloscope [byte] [byte] [byte]
|CI| 25906 15240 2860
|LATh| 153 90 18
|PZIP (LATh)| 148 92 30
|PPMZ(LATh)| 163 109 48
|Deflate(LATh)| 181 123 48
|ZPAQ(LATh)| 242 188 131
max. |C˜I| :
1. our approach 5 0 0
2. Refs. [12], [6] 16948 7029 1124
7.3 Attacks using External Memory
The proposed solution detects attacks by the usage of ex-
ternal memory with the introduction of a device-dependent
threshold ǫ < Tem. Since the threshold should be as harsh
as possible there will definetively be cases in which a false
negative will be the result of a single code attestation run.
Nevertheless we recommend to choose the Tem as harsh as
possible to indeed have a meaningful countermeasure against
an attack in which the attacker makes use of the external
memory. As a consequence, in case of a false negative one
should repeat the code attestation protocol n times where
n is factor two the number of protocol runs in which the re-
ceived x does not match to the computation at the verifier.
To restrict the number of iterations for the code attestation
protocol for a single code attestation phase we recommend
to stop the protocol in case two times the received response
x (each time with a different nonce) has been presented.
7.4 Replay Attacks
As long as the challenge nonce is always fresh replay attacks
are not possible. Consequently the size of the nonce is a
function over the lifetime of the (frequently) battery-driven
prover and the frequency of applying the code attestation
protocol. For example if the approximate lifetime of the
prover is 3 month and the verifier starts the code attesta-
tion protocol once per hour we state |nonce| should not be
smaller than four bytes (this is required to correspond to
the n chosen in 7.3). The attacker can eavesdrop over the
wireless all transmitted pairs (noncei, xi) with the objective
to resend yet eavesdropped responses xi. Since the nonce
is the only data chunk providing freshness for the response
computation, once a nonce noncer is repeatedly transmitted
by the verifier the attacker can use the time slot ǫ to upload
C˜I . However, a more realistic attack arises in case of a poor
implementation of the ’random’ choice of a nonce at the veri-
fier side. If the attacker can infer from pairs (nonce1, x1), ...,
(noncer, xr) to noncer+1 he can precompute xr+1 and the
time to upload and run C˜I extends from ǫ to the duration
until the next run of the code attestation protocol. How-
ever, running bogus code during the time interval of two
consecutive sent challenge nonces noncei and noncei+1 is al-
ways possible even without performing such a replay attack.
Thus, a proper implementation of the freshness function has
to ensure that the attacker cannot even infer a sequence of
consecutive nonces noncei, ..., noncei+j with j > 1 allowing
to run bogus code undetected during an interval [i, i+ j].
7.5 Node Depletion Attacks
If the attacker aims at wasting the energy of the non-tamper
resistant and restricted prover device he could masquer-
ade as the master device and continiously send challenges
nonce. Two countermeasures are possible here: firstly, one
could introduce a master key k which is shared between
the master device and the prover device such that x =
hk(nonce||Ch(CI)||LATh||PRW ). The hk() denotes a keyed
MAC. However, obviously this approach contradicts with
the fact that initially the attacker has full control over the
non-tamper resistant device such that the k can be read
out for subsequent depletion attacks. Due to this reason we
propose a lightweight approach in which the prover device
computes and sends at maximum n times per epoch a re-
sponse x. Here n corresponds to the number of iterations
recommended under 7.3.
7.6 Other Attacks: DoS
The protocol is not resistant against DoS attacks. To suffi-
ciently handle depletion attacks or attacks on the usage of
the external memory an attacker can always enforce the code
attestation protocol to stop. In such situations the master
device considers the code image running on the prover device
as bogus.
8. CONCLUSIONS AND OPEN ISSUES
The work at hand presents a code attestation protocol which
in particular detects compression attacks aiming to run bo-
gus code in an undetected manner. The code image is loaded
in a compressed manner. Only LAT and PRW are loaded
uncompressed. The presented approach is work in progress.
Surely, more elaborated analysis are required on a proper
choice of parameters like sh, Tpm and n. Also the role of the
cache needs to be evaluated more in depth with respect to
potential security weaknesses.
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